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As Composition and Rhetoric rose in disciplinary status and academic legitimacy
the discourse practice of negation, the positioning of texts in oppositional binaries that set
the “new” over the “old,” the “novel” over the “familiar,” became so embedded in
academic tradition it now seems to be an inherited part of scholarship instead of an
individual’s rhetorical choice and deliberate ethos strategy. Negation, when one idea or
set of ideas constructed by another is critiqued, advocated, and/or redeveloped by another
scholar, is a discourse practice firmly established in the Rhetorical Tradition as part of
Socratic dialogues, reappears in “modern rhetoric”, and is writ large within academe. To
practice negation is to be the quintessential qualitative researcher, even as negation
proves limiting to the trajectory of both logic and the making of new knowledge. Ideas,
theories, and their implications are posited as opponents within a competitive market
instead of interdependent collaborations building a body of knowledge within the
discipline. This qualitative analysis reflects John Muckelbauer’s (2008) invitation to
explore an idea/text beyond the “critique, advocate, and/or develop” strategies of
negation (Muckelbauer 43) in order to forge “experimental pathways” toward interrelated
and collaborative knowledge. By bringing plurality to inquiry, I position knowledge as a
constellation of interrelated ideas instead of a singularity “discovered.” This postmodern
approach to inquiry and analysis will demonstrate the circuitry, the interrelatedness of
meanings, while at the same time reflecting the field’s larger commitments to equity,
representation, and social justice that have not yet been reflected within the dominant
discourses brokered within the field. Rhetorical choice, even within the professional text,
thus becomes personal-public, a permeated dualism at once mapped and traced.
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FOREWARD, VERY FORWARD

As a victim of domestic violence, my personal and physical boundaries were the
battleground, the spaces in which violation, betrayal, abuses, terrors, and the totality of
my experiences rattled about, transfiguring both my sense of self and my own sense of
narrative. Secrets, brokered and kept, shame, high stakes negotiations over small stakes
issues, and a prevailing sense of hopelessness took root in every moment of my life. Far
beyond the public service announcements, beyond the public discourses, the survivors’
stories, the justice system, the ways American culture frames and discusses domestic
violence, is the absolute and total loss of control over one’s own story. The autonomous
right to write one’s narrative, to speak, act, and embody the language of one’s heart is
lost, consumed by the one willing to wield violence against the mind and the flesh in
pursuit of control. One’s boundaries become mythical, theoretical, as nothing in one’s
practices can testify to the glorious freedom of personal language, the story we write for
ourselves beyond the stories others write upon us. An abusive relationship is a binary
construction with each end of the continuum clearly marked. Whatever you think,
experience, and contemplate is defined and limited in that dualistic structure. Even as I
looked for meanings and possibilities, the vector of thought was still anchored to either
the abuser or the victim. Imagining possibility outside of the structure, beyond that
binary, felt like gazing into an abyss, the dark void and black hole that is the unknown.
Language failed me as a site for thinking because abuse creates a lexicon of the unspoken,
the hidden, and in contemplating the story of one’s life, all there is to do is fall through
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the words you would most need to say in order to be delivered from the pain of
circumstance and the material conditions of reality.

One would think that seeking help, going to the local police and telling one’s
story would be the beginning of a reclamation, an opportunity to step outside of the
binary and into autonomy. Ironically, loss of autonomy is cyclical and repetitive as the
story written is at once the victim’s and another’s. The victim alone stands before
authority and assistance, and in order to work toward owning one’s own narrative, one
must submit to the ways the justice system collects story, shapes and distorts, files, and
performs on her behalf. Personal boundaries are yet again transgressed as one is
subjected to the customs and questions others determine. To testify, to stand in public and
tell one’s story is to also lose the ability to transmit the personal narrative as experienced
in ways that feel healing and whole. The lawyers and the courts, the investigators and
assistants, listen and cull from the victim’s narratives only what fits into the
predetermined structures of penal code and process while helping a prosecutor build an
argument. When I told my story, when I shared the stories of my family with those
agency representatives appointed by city and state to assist victims of crime, I watched
well meaning and skilled people sift through my story for what would work for them in
their mission to hold someone accountable. I listened, realizing that within the justice
system I would be forced to embody that narrative yet again, perform and wallow in a
story I would never have written for myself had I the choice and the basic human right of
autonomy. My personal boundaries were yet again violated as I answered deeply personal
questions within a very public and official rhetorical site. It is through these very painful
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experiences of my story that I learned boundaries are truly a matter of privilege, of
preference and autonomy, and not everyone gets to experience the pleasure of the
personal and public dualism without complicated permeations as the two blur together to
shape one’s story.

I could, then, write a lengthy treatise about the re-victimization of domestic
violence survivors, but even this would be anchored to the binary structure of abuse itself.
John Muckelbauer (2008) calls this logical trap, a problem with change (3). Though I
would be making an attempt to critique social dynamics and institutional structures, as
Muckelbauer asserts most scholars do (3), because dialectic negation is an expected
performance within scholarship, I’d be stuck in a binary postmodern theories have yet to
dismantle, that of “the same” and “the different” (Muckelbauer 5). Critique, in its
various genres, is still a binary of one (person, text, idea) against another (person, text,
idea) because the theatre of engagement, the logical structure inherent in critique, is in
itself a limiting binary construction. Even as one draws from scholarship to establish
proofs, to complicate or enrich the critique itself, the primary structure of labeling,
identifying, and then overcoming the gap, the space between these mapped rhetorical
strategies, however rigorous and thoughtful, is still limited in trajectory because it’s
anchored to two points. Mobility of ideas, engagement, and possibility is limited to just
that space between.

Meaning, the ways in which one must champion ideas, critique others’ ideas, and
then assert one’s own thinking as “implications” – a familiar argument structure within
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academic and nonacademic arguments – still affirm a binary structure that limits the
actual movement of thought between familiar and novel, from old and new, without
moving outside of the binary logic embedded in these writing and thinking practices (3).
As Muckelbauer writes:

That is, whether the stakes are a new concept, a different social structure, a
divergent form of subjectivity, a fresh reading, or an innovative
technology, difference and novelty only emerge by somehow overcoming
or negating particular others – outdated concepts, oppressive social
structures, limited models of subjectivity, etc. In other words, for both
traditionalists and non-traditionalists, change is always and everywhere
the effect of overcoming and negation (x).

Theodor Adorno, offers dramatic affirmation of this concept when he writes,
“Unquestionably, one who submits to the dialectical discipline has to pay dearly in the
qualitative variety of experience … cognition must bow to it, unless concretion is once
more to be debased into the ideology it starts becoming in fact” (4). Within negation,
negative dialectics, even as one challenges binary structures that are representative of
larger power structures within language and culture, the trajectory of ideas is confined,
limited. Inquiry itself, ironically, is restrained by logic. Acts of negation, however,
should not be confused with engagement. Within the discipline, there is a lexicon for
negation that is not recognized as such. Words such as “challenge,” “complicate,”
“deconstruct” – just to name a few – are polite, certainly, but they are also symbolic of
the ways in which negation is tied to physicality, to the ways in which a body enacts a
force on a text. On the practical level, and through my lens of experience, negation as
practiced inside and outside scholarship strikes me as a socially approved form of
violence. Lives are lived within language and symbols. There are, in any text, people
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connected to (and sometimes disconnected from) the words. As George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson note, argument itself is often framed by American culture in terms of warfare (4).
“Though there is no physical battle,” they write, “there is a verbal battle, and the structure
of an argument – attack, counterattack, etc. – reflects this” (4). As Lakoff and Johnson
remind us, our culture places a value on a mythic objectivism, particularly in public
discourses such as media and scholarship (189), where empiricist thinking and writing
are positioned opposite the personally poetic – the subjective (191). Citing the Romantic
poets as those who rekindled humanistic fires during the Industrial Revolution, Lakoff
and Johnson posit that by doing so, they reinforced the objectivist stance. The
objective/subjective binary was codependent as each term defined, in some way, the other.
Citing metaphor as “imaginative rationality,” (193) Lakoff and Johnson invite an
opportunity to explore an experimental structure that encourages understanding of the
world around us, texts, even arguments, based on our interactions. In this sense, texts
perform a function as we function, and our personal relationship with any other can be
traced and mapped by our own language habits, preferences, and experiences.

Negation, as I position it within this text, is not simply an act of pushing back or
down. Certainly, with texts that are dehumanizing of others one would want to negate, to
champion, and to overcome. Yet, responding to any form of violence with more violence
(however noble), is still, well, violent. To imagine engagement as an affirmation when
confronted by violent texts is to re-imagine the dialectic itself by stepping outside of the
oppositional framework. According to Muckelbauer, the issue isn’t merely a challenge to
postmodern notions of dualisms and binaries, nor is it a reconfiguration of logic – the
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invention process used to engage with static terms or positions (5). Conditions for
inquiry and engagement become fixed when structured by negation, and the trajectories
of writing-as-thinking/ thinking-as-writing become limited. “Positions are not inert
places,” he writes, “they are constellations of actions (whether potential or actual)” (5).
For example, negation has become fixed in the sense that it is most prevalent in three
distinct forms: advocacy, when a privileged concept is emphasized; critique, when an
underprivileged concept is advocated; and synthesis, when some “in-between” and
indeterminate concept is valorized (Muckelbauer 6-8). Regardless of the style of
negation, the transformation itself, the challenge to make new meaning from the old, or to
engage in dialectic reasoning with that which has gone before, remains a relatively stable
endeavor in the fact that it doesn’t transform beyond the trajectory of the Hegelian
negation logic itself. In other words, “While the contents of the positions may change,
the structure of negative relations stays the same” (Muckelbauer 11). To move beyond
negation, may mean moving beyond the objective tendencies of professional scholarship
and toward a subjective construction that creates writing room for personal relationships
– the ways language, including hate language, advertising, personal, and public
discourses – are interconnected to our own everyday language choices and contexts.
Moving beyond negation means giving up the privileged position of opposition in order
to follow where thinking and inquiry may lead instead of taking a declared stance, and
then performing scholarly argument traditions and negation. It means moving beyond
binary constructions and into unfamiliar territory where even “bad” ideas are welcomed
and acknowledged as contributors and coordinates to one’s ideas that follow while
affirming the journey, the pathway, that lead to one’s ideas.
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For example, the alleged separation of “the personal” from “the public,” a binary
construction that erases the human connections between text and the embodied acts that
come with textual production – inquiry, the acts of reading and discovery, the ways
words strum the chords of our inner passions that become professional performances, all
the ways writers sit to write and bring their human experiences and emotions to their
work – are rendered invisible, unspoken, even erased, by the limited movements we can
make within the binary itself and its boundaries. If Lakoff and Johnson are affirmed in
their claims that the subjective/objective binary structure is an offshoot of larger cultural
and historical moments, then a line of inquiry opens – tentative, uncertain, but open all
the same. Is the separation between “the public” and “the personal” just another trope for
the separation between objectivity and subjectivity? If so, then negation becomes, in a
sense, a mechanism of limitation, of control, a bargaining for the right to share story
within a dehumanized structure of tradition and publication.

In other words, in order to speak, and to speak well within academic-public
tradition, one must first find personal allies and form alliances, critique “the other” as
flawed, then overcome these flaws with carefully constructed implications, without
acknowledging the deeply personal experiences of writing and thinking, and the
incredible and deeply felt act of writing itself. In order to speak, one must testify while
others sort from such testimony what they deem important. The writer/thinker becomes
subject to an authoritative mechanism working within the public (in this case, the
discipline’s) interest. Yet, to step outside of the structure is to risk, as Muckelbauer
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acknowledges, the creation of something unrecognizable, as negation is seemingly
inseparable from what scholars are called to do. Perhaps recognition is a privilege itself,
the cost of membership that limits what Adorno terms the “qualitative variety of
experience.” In order to enrich the qualitative variety within qualitative research, one may
have to ride out the discomfort of permeation by restructuring binaries into hyphenated,
codependent, and interrelated terms that serve as mere locations, the beginnings of
inquiry. In this sense, affirmation is not simply an alternative or oppositional stance to
negation (thus a recreation of a binary itself), but a different mode of thinking entirely,
one in which ideas are mapped, traced, and explored instead of positioned in competition
with on another. For example, instead of positioning “the public” against “the personal,”
I imagine a term, something that reflects the nature of how our own interests and passions
become our professional calling as scholars and teachers, the work for me is personalpublic, interrelated, embodied, and performed.

Enriching my own qualitative experience in this work has meant taking the notion
of “public” and “personal” as I’ve encountered it within the discipline, and pointing to
the interrelations instead of the oppositional differences. Barbara Kamler, in Relocating
the Personal: A Critical Writing Pedagogy (2001), invites consideration of spatiality and
power, the politics of location and locatedness (171). Personal-public narration,
propelled by affirmation instead of dragged down by negation, is allowed mobility once
the binary boundaries are permeated. As Kamler notes, there is a need to create distance
between the writer and experience, in order to ensure the personal “…is relocated in other
spaces – political, social, cultural – rather than understood simply as the province of the
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private and individual” (Kamler 171). In evoking my personal history as a foreground
for my professional work, I am not making mere use of drama to intrigue or capture an
audience. Instead, I am presenting an individual experience to demonstrate the personalpublic construction of violence as a shared experience across contexts. Though violence
is contextual, the effects of violence seem to have an interrelated universality even as the
intensity and timbre of those effects may vary. In the moment when one feels denied
autonomous representation, whether in a personal relationship or a professional tradition,
the pain of that denial is on the same register. Fear, discomfort, even displacement; selfdoubt, recrimination, and a sense of futility; must be overcome either by a Nietzschean
“will to power,” or a bevy of rhetorical strategies commonly known as disruptions or
complications. We all, when in the face of power, bargain for our right to personal
expression, even when that power presents itself as a Foucauldian panoptic structure
within discourse traditions inside and outside of scholarship. Power need not be visible
to be felt, to truncate inquiry, and to inhibit one’s sense of freedom to speak, write, and
think.

Yet, if the binary boundaries become ruptured, permeated by our own refusal to
take positions of negation, the personal-public becomes a tremendous source of both
affirmation and inquiry. Yes, the risk is that some discourses will not be easily
recognized, labeled within the confines of genre, and welcomed into the fold of
comfortable categorization, but the opportunity to move beyond binaries and their
cognitive limitations will require that sort of risk in this postmodern era. John
Muckelbauer terms the risk itself as “imprecision,” when explanation yields to
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demonstration (xi), as the writer experiences “the indistinguishable aspects of subjectivity
and sociality” (9) in order to disrupt negation and find indeterminate, infinite and inbetween spaces for inquiry and exploration (9). By demonstrating how our personal
experiences and social locations shape our public lives – our vocations, ethical
commitments, and performance of Self in front of Others – are interrelated, intertwined, I
hope to nurture lines of inquiry through affirmation. In this text, I begin with mapping
coordinate points in my thinking without positioning myself against other ideas in order
to write room for affirming, encouraging, and more complex inroads to inquiry. There
will be imprecision, of this I am sure, but I am willing to risk the discomfort in order to
find a pathway toward understanding the personal-public. It seems to me that meaningful
inquiry leads only to more meaningful inquiry (that’s the pain and yet the promise), but
the goal of affirmation is to invite imprecision as a tool for exploration. As John
Muckelbauer writes:
Rather than extracting claims to be advocated, critiqued, or developed, and
rather than just diagnosing the performative movement within the writing,
an affirmative inclination encounters writing as an experimental pathway,
a relay on an intensive, inventive circuit (43).

The circuitry demonstrated in this thesis begins with a historical view of the
tensions between “the personal” and “the public” Susan Jarratt explores in Rereading the
Sophists (1991). From there, I will write my way toward an exploration of historical
tensions between ideological stances among a few of Composition and Rhetoric’s wellknown writers, such as James Berlin, Lil Brannon, and C.H. Knoblauch. Relying on
affirmation as a means through which to explore analysis, I will then demonstrate the
interrelations between Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald’s Available Means: An Anthology of
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Women’s Rhetoric(s) (2001) and affirmation as a rhetorical strategy. My goal is not to
provide a determinate answer to a thesis question, but to sponsor inquiry that reaches
beyond the binary construction of personal v. public, and toward a more inviting and
inclusive exploration of the personal-public as a site of future inquiry.

1

SECTION I: HISTORICIZING THE PUBLIC AND PERSONAL
Considering its histories, it could be said that the field of Composition and
Rhetoric has fostered two distinct traits in its evolution from Classic rhetorical theories
and practices, to a specialized field in American universities and colleges. One of these
traits could be called extrovert, in the sense that limited-public, published discourses
generated by scholars have an outward trajectory as contributions to the Rhetoric and
Composition canon. As Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg note, “Rhetoric in its
various incarnations has been a powerful force in public affairs and in education for most
of its existence since the fifth century B.C.E., when it developed in Greek probate courts
and flourished under Greek democracy” (1). In Plato’s Gorgias, even as Socrates presses
Gorgias for a definition of rhetoric, as Gorgias himself states the extroverted self-topublic nature of oratory and audience, even as Plato’s Socrates seems to find a deep
philosophical cleft between rhetoric and truth, he uses a communal, dialogic structure of
self-to-other. Aristotle claims this person-to-a-public trait, the trajectory of self in
relationship to others, when he writes, “The genres of rhetoric are three in number, which
is the number of the types of audience” (80). Without an audience, without community
with one or more listeners, the rhetorician cannot fulfill this trajectory of extroversion,
the rhythms of persuasion. Cicero constructs the ideal orator-as-rhetorician as “…one
who is able to speak in court or in deliberative bodies so as to prove, to please and to
sway or persuade” (Bizzell & Herzberg 339).
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This classical sense of public remains with us, appearing in diverse ways, from
multiple rhetorical, theoretical, and pedagogical perspectives, even those that claim to be
markedly different, such as the divisions between “current-traditionalists” and
“postmodernists,” between the “old” and the “new.” Scholars such as James Berlin,
Robert Connors, John Brereton, James Slevin, C.H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon, Patricia
Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg – just to name a few – have chronicled, collected, organized,
and sorted histories with remarkable skill and thorough care. Despite differences
between their individual preferences and/or ideologies, collectively their works provide a
breathtaking view of the field’s extroversion, the public sky of possibility for writing and
speaking. Charting rhetorical stars, from Berlin’s claim that, “Writing courses prepare
students for citizenship in a democracy, for assuming their political responsibilities as
leaders or simply as active participants” (189); to Knoblauch and Brannon’s claim, “For
it is in the creative rewriting of past discourse that we witness the progress of learning;
and it is the progress of learning that insures individual growth and the perpetuation of
culture” (72); to Connor’s assertion that, “The true researcher was expected, from his
seminar papers through his dissertation (which was required in every case to be
published) to show his worth as a scholar by disseminating his findings through a system
of professional publications” (177); to Bizzell and Herzberg’s claim, “Rhetoric has
always been concerned with political action and the search for knowledge” (16), a
constellation of extroverted agendas for and of Rhetoric emerges.

Through these works and others, the extroverted traits of Composition and
Rhetoric became more visible, allowing us to see what we could not, or would not allow
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ourselves to see before. This visibility, too, helped us to see what was not visible in order
to “transcend” what Kenneth Burke terms, “terministic screens,” the constructed
reflections of Rhetoric’s historical “realities” that also named by not naming, the
deflection of other constructed realities. Each contributor to the collective history of
Rhetoric asserted key terms, and those terms framed the nature and trajectory of the
contributor’s work. As Burke writes, “Not only does the nature of our terms affect the
nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms direct attention to one field rather
than to another” (Burke 1343). Robert Connors, in his framing of Composition-rhetoric,
positions the field as “ …a modern rhetoric, quickly changing and adapting, driven by
potent social and pedagogical needs, and running on the rails of an ever cheaper, ever
quicker, and ever more competitive printing technology,” (7) yet the fast track of
modernity was not without its benefits. The extroversion and public debate, broadened
and deepened by print technology, made it possible get a closer (albeit less comfortable)
look at what was once hidden, subsumed by dominant discourses in the field. In other
words, within the presence of the published work, within the extroversion, other scholars
found opportunities by exploring erasures, gaps, absences, and contradictions.

Scholars such as Susan Jarratt, Cheryl Glenn, Joy Ritchie, Kate Ronald, Susan
Kates, Karen Foss, Andrea Lunsford, and Susan Miller explored these opportunities to
propagate their presence within the public conversations about the field’s histories. From
Jarratt, the field receives an invitation to reconsider Plato’s degradation of the sophists as
not just history, but also a contemporary current in Western philosophy and scholarship
(xxiii). Inviting us to complicate “…certain assumptions about the independent status and
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function of narrative and rational argument…” (31), Jarratt opens a middle space between
two distinct positions within a dualism: mythos/logos. As Jarratt writes:
Curiously absent from many discussions of the emergence of literacy and
rationality in the classical period, rhetoric – and particularly sophistic
rhetoric- will provide two ways of challenging the dualism of
mythos/logos. At one end of the historical continuum, we find argument
and introspection in the epic; at the other, we examine the role of myth in
sophistic contributions to the rational evolution. Relocating the sophists
and rhetoric in the “progress” from orality to literacy will work against the
historical view of rhetoric bursting out abruptly as a rough-and-ready
practice in the fifth century, to be fully realized as a theory only by the
next generation (31-2).

Working within and at times, against, this continuum, Jarratt maps a pre-Socratic path of
myth – narrative storytelling and the recitals of Homeric epics – as a sophistic art and
craft that instructs, explains natural phenomenon, shares social codes, and conveys
knowledge about technology and geography (32). As Jarratt notes, the pleasurable,
almost transcendental reception of spoken performances in oral culture was an extension
of cultural practices that provided contexts, such as “…religious events and competitions,
in after-dinner entertainments for all classes, by teachers and students in educational
settings, even around the fires of military encampments” (Jarratt citing Havelock 33).
Narrative was the site for intellectual engagement and the sharing of history and
knowledge, and not a mere poetic trance of mythos lacking in philosophical and logical
content, or logos. “More central to our understanding of the sophists,” Jarratt writes, “the
rhetorical moments of the epic – persuasive situations and internal deliberations – supply
the most concentrated examples of logic and argument within the larger narrative” (35).
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Jarratt’s work is a complication of not just the linear history of Rhetoric, but also
the dominance of Platonic and Aristotelian logics casting the long, suspicious shadow
over pre-Socratic and sophistic logics embedded in cultural practices, including narrative.
Drawing from the work of Ruth Finnegan (1977) and M.M. Willcock (1964), Jarratt
positions Homer’s Iliad and similar narrative, poetic works as “published” instead of
“transmitted” texts, shaped to suit the both audience and circumstance (36-7). Reintroducing the term nomos, Jarratt positions a space between the mythos/logos dualism
that invites a more generous reading of sophistic rhetoric, pedagogies, and practices.
“With the sophists,” Jarratt writes, “nomos, a self-conscious arrangement of discourse to
create politically and socially significant knowledge, enters a middle term between
mythos and logos” (60). The significance of this intermediary term is not simply a matter
of vocabulary. The term itself contains a geographical connotation of inclusion, one that
is located atop the terrain people inhabit, as well as one that includes the customary,
people-centered common law of the time, with each definition built on an assumption of
human agency (Jarratt 41). This introduction of the term serves as a fruitful rupture, one
that invites us to reconsider place, context, and people as essential to epistemology and its
human consequences, the very significance of why thinking, writing, and inquiry matter
beyond the comforts of tradition. In this small term, nomos, we find room, writing room,
to redefine “personal” as essential, as requisite, as the context through which invention
and inquiry are possible, instead of limiting the definition of “personal” to just the body,
as the body. In this sense the personal – the set of circumstances that the body finds
room in which to be relevant to knowledge and discovery, urge teachers and students
forward as people and writers instead of becoming trapped in negation. The personal

6
reflects the essence of who they are, what they think they know and why they think they
know it, as well as the intersections of difference and locations from which we think,
write, and learn. It is there that the notion of another term, the personal-public, emerges.
As writers examine and explore the disjunctions in their interrelated experiences, those
disjunctions become spaces for inquiry. Inquiry begins within what Jacques Derrida
terms, “contextual rupture” (1483). Though “rupture” is a term that has an action, it is
not an action directed at a specific person, a body. Instead, and outside of negation, a
ruptured context becomes an opportunity for another round of inquiry as one
contemplates the interrelatedness within a context instead of squaring off against (yet)
another idea, working to overcome whatever shortcomings that idea may have, and then
championing a “new” position. However, contextual rupture, too, requires patience with
both ambiguity and questioning. Good questions just lead to better questions, and though
academe wants to broker meaning and a body of knowledge, it may be time to offer up
inquiries and questions instead. Perhaps then, a public university would actually cultivate
and invite public discourses within the context of shared community.

By contrast, and within the paternal privilege of history, Plato’s dialectic method
shaped a consciousness on a foundation of distance, critical analysis, and hypotactic logic
(Jarratt 34-5). Plato’s sense of structure went beyond metaphysics and philosophy.
“Never at ease with the democracy, he laid out a stratified social order in which classes
and roles were rigidly defined and power was reserved for the few” (Jarratt 64). In
Plato’s Republic, as Glaucon, Socrates, and Aeimantus imagine the creation of a
“luxurious city,” while sorting jobs, responsibilities, and the interrelated nature of life in
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their utopian town, it’s interesting to note the men construct an army before they
construct an education system (Plato 49). Good guardians and city protectors are
compared to the spirit of dogs (Plato 51), and this spirit must be honed by education. To
secure loyalty, Socrates posits that as good servants of the city, they must take great care
in determining both the lesson and its vessel. “Then we must first of all, it seems,
supervise the storytellers,” Socrates asserts, before determining that the stories
themselves must be sorted to suit their purposes, and “mothers and nurses” must be
persuaded to tell only the stories the governors select (Plato 53). Plato’s distrust of the
poetic, the mythos narratives of the sophistic past, becomes evident as Socrates claims
that even “the major stories” contain falsehoods. When asked what stories could be
considered major in their day, Socrates replies, “Those that Homer, Hesiod, and other
poets tell us, for surely they composed false stories, told them to people, and are still
telling them” (53).

Socrates objects to the multi-theistic construction of gods as flawed gods
possessing human qualities of anger and vengeance, as in Hesiod’s Theogony, and
Homer’s Iliad. As he critiques poets’ framing of the gods in their art, Socrates asserts
that human suffering is not of the heavenly realm, handed down by gods, but that when
humans are punished, paying a penalty, they are rewarded by the gods for that suffering
(Plato 56). Poets who claim otherwise should be banished from the city. “We won’t
allow poets to say that the punished are made wretched and that it was a god who made
them so,” Socrates claims (Plato 56). In other words, in the narratives trafficked by
culture as well as the sophists, the gods were too similar to humans, and naïve listeners
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were at risk of making tremendous interpretative mistakes. “The young can’t distinguish
what is allegorical from what isn’t, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to
erase and apt to become unalterable,” Socrates states as his primary critique of the very
Homeric and sophistic narratives Jarratt points to as vessels of cultural currency,
knowledge, tradition, and lore.

In the work we do with students, in the ways we shape and collect their stories, as
they collect and shape their meanings, we can break the long-held, and debilitating claim
that “personal writing” is not valuable within “academic” contexts. We can demonstrate
how qualitative research, how the collection of stories as data, is what sociologist Brené
Brown terms, “data with a soul” (2010). The ways in which students move in and out of
courses, departments, disciplines, even as they make their way through curricula and
choice, writing courses are often the only true opportunities for reflection, for setting
down and getting into contemplative reasoning, dialectic inquiry, class discussion, and a
sense of community beyond the social structures universities and colleges provide within
dormitories and housing. It’s sometimes their only opportunity, with guidance from
instructors and fellow writers, to chronicle their sense of nomos, their sense of
commonality on the landscape of the institutions in which they work and live. Contextual
ruptures become experiments with interrelatedness and metaphor, inquiries into the ways
we use language (and it uses us, as Burke would say), as well as moments of enriched
qualitative experience and for rationality built upon the imaginative and speculative – the
interior nature by which we question our exterior experiences.
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As Jarratt notes, Plato would labor greatly to separate myth from logic, to assert
that proper statesmanship relied on speaking artfully and logically (34), though in Greek
culture the poet’s function was to provide practical instruction and moral advice while
captivating audiences with mystic tales of the mythic world (Jarratt citing Guthrie 34). In
the pre-Socratic eras, it was narrative and not argument that provided, within cultural
contexts, the opportunities to consider spiritual, cultural, and intellectual issues, a form of
consciousness that required public argument and internal debate prior to the fifth century
B.C.E. (Jarratt 35). The ideological and philosophical tension between the sophists and
the Socratics, apart from being political while positioning “common” people in
opposition to an aristocratic class, were also cultural – an antiquated example of
contemporary “culture war” when the aristocratic “high” classes began taking aim at the
“lower” classes in a wrestle for power. Much was at stake for the orators and teachers in
ancient Athens as those with the powers of persuasion were rewarded in status and
monetary wealth. Educated commoners would expect more in life, perhaps demand more,
than the portion afforded them under Plato’s systemic construction of democracy.

As Samuel Ijessling charts in his historical survey of rhetoric and philosophy,
“Rhetoric therefore nearly always has something to do with property, with acquired or
supposed rights, and with prestige and privileges” (11). Ijessling asserts that this alone
could be cause for Plato’s turn against rhetoric and toward conversation (14). According
to Ijessling, Plato searches to distinguish between what seems sensible (as in the mythosladen epic, the stories of the gods), and that which is within the “intelligible order” (Truth
as divined through dialectic). As Ijessling writes, “The former is the world of appearance,
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presentation, opinion (doxa) and physics, while the latter is the world of true being, ideal
and essence, knowledge (episteme) and metaphysics” (14). Ijessling helps to shape the
logos/mythos dualism within the realm of philosophy, noting that Plato was suspicious of
sophists and rhetoric – often linking the two as intertwined – because the strongest
orators of the time were so skilled in the illusory, in using probability as a prevailing
logic (14). Western metaphysics is born from Plato’s polemical treatises against
sophistry, his sense of the differences between appearance and being (Ijessling 15). The
consequences have been pervasive and persistent across the historical record of
philosophy and rhetoric. As Ijessling writes:
Philosophy and science are extremely critical of rhetoric which is rejected
on the grounds that nothing claimed by orators, poets, preachers or
authorities exceeds the order of the probable, but merely constitutes
opinion (doxa), tradition, prejudice, ideology or at least the lack of
certainty and inability to withstand doubt and questioning (15).

Within philosophy, too, Plato’s polemics against the sophists have shaped far too much
of the philosophical enterprise. As Ijessling writes:
Yet another consequence of Plato’s polemic against the sophists and
rhetoricians is that such a thing as metaphysics could arise and moreover a
metaphysics with an onto-theological structure, constituting a massive
foundation on which many philosophers since Plato have continually been
building. Perhaps today the edifice is collapsing on all sides, but this is
essentially related to a radical reflection on language and to the clearly
perceptible rehabilitation of rhetoric (15).

As Ijessling notes, without words, human relations, law, politics, state, judicial procedure,
education, science, literature, and a host of other interactions would be impossible (19).
“For this reason,” Ijessling writes, “philosophy can never regard language as just one
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more subject of reflection. Language is rather a transcendental conditio sine qua non of
every philosophy” (19).

When one ponders the residue of Platonic thought on the body of philosophical
and rhetorical scholarship, particularly the sense that both were in conflict that arose to a
peak in Plato’s day (Ijessling 7), Jarratt’s work, particularly her assertions regarding
nomos, invites us to reconsider the philosophical and cultural stakes of the mythos/logos
dualism and constructions of the personal-public. By inserting a term between the binary
construction Jarratt makes it possible for us to reflect on the culture of narrative beyond
mere genre considerations of the epic, allegory, theatre, and story; beyond a philosophical
continuum with the Sophists on one side and Plato on the other. The sophistic use of
narrative reflected an inclusion of human agency, and as Jarratt notes, Plato and his
student, Aristotle, would find this inclusion unacceptable. As Jarratt writes:
They condemned the sophistic ‘style’ for a range of features that, in fact,
together sketch a profile of an alternative epistemic field: generic diversity,
loose organization, a reliance on narrative, physical pleasure in language
production and reception, a holistic psychology of communication, and an
emphasis on the aural relation between speaker and listener (72).
This condemnation remains with us today, as part of a philosophical and rhetorical
inheritance that often shapes theoretical positions regarding narrative, epistemology,
language, and the teaching of writing. Jarratt’s challenge to this inheritance is just one
example of the public ways the field of Composition and Rhetoric contemplates, within
public view, histories and consequences. Jarratt’s challenge for the field, apart from a call
to (re)consider the Sophists, is also a challenge to (re)consider the mythos/logos dualism
and the long-held prejudices that place mythos as subordinate or inferior to logos. “I
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labor this point,” Jarratt writes, “because of the degree to which poetry and story-telling
are today seen as tainted by a kind of irrationality, making them unsuitable means for
expressing serious thought and negotiating public discussions” (34).

Jarratt’s work is an important example of what Krista Ratcliffe terms, “rhetorical
listening,” (196) just as it is an example of the powerful possibilities within histiography
itself. By listening to the public conversations within the field of Rhetoric and
Composition with an intent to hear the personal-public and its webbings, or, “…the they
in we” (Ratcliffe 220), one can find meaningful and important lines of inquiry that foster
a more democratic, culturally contextual, construction of the field. Contextually
rupturing the linear map so often noted in Rhetoric’s history as a journey from a
burgeoning democratic polis to today’s philosophical and rhetorical theories – an
inheritance from antiquity already set in stone, in print – also disrupts a male-centric
history within Rhetoric and Composition. There have been many notable contextual
ruptures within the discipline, particularly during the last thirty years. Most writers of
these texts include in their introductions, some personal sense as to what sponsored their
drive to see the work through. These motivations are often personal, as in, embodied, as
women scholars share a common ache to see, reclaim, and research to find the women
who have gone before them. The patriarchal structure of education, of scholarship itself,
as Robert Connors notes, “The continuing discipline of rhetoric was shaped by male
rituals, male contests, male ideals, and masculine agendas,” and “Women were
definitively excluded from all that rhetoric implied” (24). Though the nineteenth century
was a historical moment of what Connors terms a “shift” in this masculine-centered sense
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of rhetoric (24), the field has experienced contextual disruptions that don’t rely on the
negation of the male history. The history itself is not overcome – it is affirmed, and then
the disjunctions and interrelated histories are explored.

From Cheryl Glenn, the field gets a retelling of Rhetoric’s history, one that
includes women. As Glenn reminds us, no other intellectual endeavor, “…not even the
male bastion of philosophy – has so consciously rendered women invisible and silent” (2).
Despite the fact that women have been engaged in philosophical work since (at least) 600
B.C.E. (Glenn citing Mary Ellen Waithe 183), they remain as “interruptions” and silences.
However, one should not declare such silence as absentia (Glenn 2). Glenn asserts that
even Plato, the same man suspicious of narrative and mythos in Jarratt’s account of
sophistic history, allowed two women into his Academy. Lasthenia of Mantinea and
Axiothea of Philesia were admitted (53), though Axiothea disguised her gender. From
Glenn, we get an account of Plato asserting some sense of gender equity for a few, select
women within a Greek culture that relegated women to the private sphere. As Glenn
writes:
The teacher-Plato who would allow women to penetrate his intellectual
sphere would be the same writer-Plato to mention female teachers,
Aspasia and Diotima, in his work. So although Plato explores the
gendered tensions between domestic and public life and opportunities,
although his writings help reconstruct the intellectual, social, and political
achievements of some women, he cannot explain those tensions away
entirely (53).

Glenn chronicles other well-known historical figures in Rhetoric’s history. According to
Glenn, Cicero preferred the era of male-dominance in early Rome, when women were
equal to barbarians (61-2) because they were constructions of “failed males” (62).
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Though laws changed over time and permitted Roman women with a limited sense of
public life, “Roman women lived in subjugation in comparison to the most retiring
Roman male” (63). Yet, Glenn also provides historical record of upper-class Roman
women such as Cornelia, Hortensia, Amasia Sentia and Gaia Afrania, Sempronia, Fulvia,
and Octavia while chronicling their public lives (Glenn 66-71).

Glenn’s work to assert women’s rhetorical participation from antiquity to the
Renaissance (1997) serves as yet another version of histiography and challenge. What
makes Glenn’s work so remarkable, is her deliberate decision to “resist closure,” to
consider her work finished. She invites us to join her because, “A re-gendered, retold
rhetorical tradition opens up – not closes down – investigation into rhetorical practices”
(173). Through Glenn’s work, we are reminded that gender is a language structure, “…a
concept borrowed from grammar…” (173) and that her work worries the boundaries of
“…gender that have for far too long been easily accepted as nature’s empirical design for
masculine superiority, for patriarchal representations of the universal” (173). Even more
interesting, when considering the mythos/logos dualism positioned by Jarratt, is Glenn’s
non-closing use of narrative as she writes an account of her study while constructing a
somewhat Aristotelian forensic appeal to our shared future. Glenn suggests four ways for
the field, and those in the field, to publicly and privately embark on similar work
surrounding gender and rhetorical tradition. Glenn asks us to recognize our common
ground (174), explore collaboration in various ways (175), to (re)consider silence as the
most “undervalued and under-understood traditionally feminine rhetorical site” for
scholarship and inquiry (175-6, emphasis original), and to not relegate ourselves to
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scrambling for historical bits of women’s rhetoric (177). Glenn reminds us that history’s
treatment (and mistreatment) of women’s intellectual and rhetorical work affords us
tremendous possibility. “In every disciplinary field,” Glenn writes, “the neglect of
women in the past has been so complete that the opportunities for exploration and
experimentation are rich and plentiful for anyone who wants to do the necessary work”
(178). Without her use of narrative at the non-closure of her academic treatise, Glenn’s
public call to mutual possibility and invitation to share in the responsibility to collect
narratives and histories, would not have the same appeal to our mythic sense of shared
narrative as a field, as people in a field, as writers and keepers of history and lore.
Sometimes the mythos/logos dualism, when paired with disruption to the status quo, can
sparkle against the backdrop of a sky we thought we already knew by tradition. This
serves as an opportunity to explore how our contexts as people, as collaborators, matter
beyond the classroom, beyond even the sense of self. When we write toward non-closure
and with imprecision, when we work within public to invite the discourses to be turned
inward in a moment of personal contemplation for our readers, we help shape the future
of the field and its relevance to the larger culture. We make it possible for those who
come after us to find their own light, their own way to work through both their personalpublic lives.
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SECTION II: AN EXPLORATION OF AFFIRMATION

Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald, in Available Means: An Anthology of Women’s
Rhetoric (2001), inspired in part by Cheryl Glenn and Krista Ratcliffe (among others),
embarked on mission in spirit with Glenn’s call for collection. Referencing themselves
first as teachers of rhetorical tradition, Ritchie and Ronald then posit themselves as those
seeking to interrupt the allegedly “seamless” historical record of Rhetoric (xvi). Like
Glenn they make wise use of narrative, explaining not just the impetus for their project,
but also the questions and complications that arose as they compiled their collection.
Guiding their collection is the Aristotelian notion of invention. “The discovery of the
available means,” Ritchie and Ronald write, “was for Aristotle an act of invention that
always assumed the right to speak in the first place and, even prior to that, assumed the
right to personhood and self-representation, rights that have not long been available to
women (xvii). Their collection reclaims women’s rhetorics just as it reclaims Aristotle’s
words (xvii), even as they point to difference. They valorize women’s efforts to be heard,
while at the same time contributing to the public discourse a sense that women’s rhetoric
may be vastly different from the traditional view. As Ritchie and Ronald write:
But we also intend by our title to point to the ways that women have
discovered different means of persuasion, often based in contexts other
than those Aristotle may have imagined: the kitchen, parlor, and nursery;
the garden; the church; the body. Further, women have redefined and
subverted traditional means and ends of argument and in the process have
reinvented rhetoric based in epistemologies more varied than Aristotle’s
(xvii).
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However, Ritchie and Ronald do not reflect the Platonic notion of negation. They are
careful to acknowledge culture, context, and episteme. In this sense, there is a certain
sophistic awareness within their work. They acknowledge the male tradition without
negating it (xviii), they position themselves with, not against, anthologists Jacqueline
Jones Royster and Shirley Wilson Logan. Instead, they invoke a minstrel chorus of
possibility, noting that they are not interested in erasing accomplishments that have come
before their own. They are, in other words, working within a gap within the public,
extroverted tradition in hopes of fostering further study. As Ritchie and Ronald write, “In
the absence of any sense of ‘recurring themes’ – common practices, themes, and topoi in
women’s rhetoric – students and scholars need to posit a tentative tradition if only to
begin to have a fruitful and generative conversation about it (xviii).” To think of one’s
scholarly work as “tentative” and “generative,” is to also be working beyond the negation
binary. It is also within Peter Elbow’s sense of “doubting and believing” – whatever
meaning is made is shaped by a tentative, contextual, and I dare I say, sophistic sense of
epistemic possibility. By positioning their work as part of a larger contribution, and a
humble, careful one at that, Ritchie and Ronald also invite, as Glenn does, future
scholarship, future invention. This is no small contribution considering the legacy of
women’s suppression within the history and contemporary world of Composition and
Rhetoric. What we make visible, we also conceal, as the infamous Kenneth Burke idea
goes – and perhaps in time, with our concerted effort to invite invention and inquiry that
does not erase or negate others, we may in time, create a representation of the field that
can soften the hurt of those who were erased, dismissed, pushed down and aside, and help
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their contemporaries find their way into the field, into the community, and into our larger
shared world.

In their collection, Ritchie and Ronald recover narrative as a rhetorical and logical
enterprise that fits within the nomos construction Jarratt articulates for narrative itself. In
this between space within the mythos/logos dualism, Ritchie and Ronald evoke Andrea
Lunsford’s call to “listen hard” (6) to women’s narratives as sites for theory. “As we
have put this anthology together,” Ritchie and Ronald write, “we have tried to be the kind
of readers who listen hard for theory within texts that often seem largely personal,
practical, or occasional” (xxviii). To “listen – and listen hard – (Lunsford 6) is to
reconfigure both tradition and the possibility for narrative, to reclaim the pre-Socratic and
Sophist use of narrative as a site for intellectual and personal engagement. Even so, the
act of recovery does present contextual limits. As Ritchie and Ronald write:
The recovery practice also isolates various communities of women from
each other and prevents us from asking questions such as: What rhetorical
means have white women borrowed from women of color? What
rhetorical strategies does the public rhetoric of late-nineteenth-century
African American women have in common with white women’s
discourse? This form of recovery also isolates women’s rhetorics from the
masculinist rhetorical tradition, distorting our understanding of women’s
use of the various means on which they called to speak and write (xix).

As they provide the field with a rich anthology of women’s voices and narratives, even as
they acknowledge isolation and cultural tensions such a collection may inadvertently
erase, Ritchie and Ronald are quite careful to name the public, field context in which
their book appears. “We are still nervous about the selections here, concerned that this
table of contents might not represent a broad enough range of women’s perspectives, that
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we have overlooked women writers because of our own disciplinary and historical
blinders (xxi-ii). This acknowledgement of Burke’s “terministic screens,” this articulation
of visibility and invisibility, of contextual and subjective “blindness” to others, is yet
another important example of a cognitive structure that does not rely on negation. Even
more affirming, is the way Ritchie and Ronald at once evoke Aristotelian rhetoric with
“available means,” while at the same time resisting his sense of fallacious arguments and
probability.

Aristotle, in his treatise On Rhetoric, in the words of George Kennedy, refers to
Chapter 24, “Real and Apparent, or Fallacious Enthymemes,” as one written, “…not to
teach how to compose fallacious enthymemes, though Aristotle’s wording at times seems
to imply that, but to help a speaker recognize them when employed by others” (Aristotle
204). At the heart of Aristotle’s treatment of fallacious argument is an accusation against
Isocrates (a well-known sophist and rhetorician), for using apparent logic instead of “true”
or “real” logic in his Evagoras. For Aristotle, there is a deep suspicion of probability, of
narrative probabilities in particular (205). As Kennedy notes, Aristotle’s evocation of
“eristics” in sophistic argument, reflect a philosophical tension between the confusion
between general and particular, one that positions probability – when suppositions can be
exposed through story, but not through Platonic dialectic – as unethical (209). “For some
things happen contrary to probability,” Aristotle writes, “so what is contrary to
probability is also probable. If this is so, the improbable will be probable” (209).
Aristotle then points specifically to sophistic argument, to eristics, because the
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generalities employed in sophistic argument that do not disclose “the circumstances and
reference and manner,” in turn, “makes for deception” (Aristotle 209).

Thus, when Ritchie and Ronald disclose not just their internal questions, but also
the disciplinary and subjective limitations of their vision, the call for readers to “listen
hard” for probability, for theory within narrative, is both qualified (in Aristotle’s sense)
and virtuous. Meaning, because Ritchie and Ronald are so careful to construct the
limitations and pressures on their collection, they make it possible for us to imagine and
re-imagine women’s rhetorical and theoretical contributions to the “tradition” as
probability with a purpose, without creating enthymemes that are, as Aristotle would say,
deceptive. This is important within the dualism of mythos/logos, because the nomos, the
common law of the discipline as well as the shared topography of scholarship, positioned
by Ritchie and Ronald open up possibilities for further inquiry, for invention and
scholarship that does not require one to negate shared histories. In other words, Ritchie
and Ronald cast an affirmation, a rich possibility, others can build from and with while
contributing to the field. They invite, without violence or erasure, opportunities for
introspection – the personal inversion when discourses turn inward to help us shape our
own thinking, our own sense of nomos within the logos/mythos dualism, while exploring
the implications of the public beyond matters of genre and convention. They invite an
affirmation of the roles language, history, and rhetoric play in our personal-public lives.
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SECTION III: IMPLYING CLOSURE FOR THE SAKE OF GENRE

Irish poet and philosophic theologian John O’Donohue, in his book, Beauty:
Rediscovering the True Sources of Compassion, Serenity, and Hope (2003) writes
eloquently of beauty and its source: imagination. I first encountered his work after
learning from my mother that our family had Irish roots – something she had never
thought to disclose before. When I expressed fascination and a bit of disbelief upon
learning my great-grandmothers were named O’Dooley and Murphy, my mother said,
“What? Where did you think the dark hair and blue eyes came from, Canada?”
“Why didn’t you tell me this before?” I asked, incredulous.
“I dunno. You didn’t ask.”
It seems to me that the most interesting and valuable part of history is not the one
handed down, but the one you ask for and eventually find. In contemplating my own
history as a survivor of domestic violence, in looking at the field’s historical dualism
between “the personal” and “the public,” I found a space in which to reconfigure personal
experience as a public and professional contribution. It was through the tracing of
Jarratt’s framing of nomos and the mythos/logos dualism that I first discovered, as a lived
and not just read experience, possible names for survivor narratives beyond “personal”
and/or “confessional.” The personal-public as an interrelated, intertwined identity
location affirms more than it negates, allowing me to say what is largely unspeakable
within strictly professional and public discourses. My story, the one I write every day as
I teach, is a story of pedagogical practices that are tied to my history. As a victim, I
learned to listen hard to my abuser, to take an emotional temperature of the room to note
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shifts in mood, and then take action or enact submissiveness. I learned that silence is a
rhetorical choice, though at the time I could not see it as the strategy of survival,
something valuable beyond those moments of terror. It was through my scholarship and
the qualitative experience offered by Cheryl Glenn and Krista Ratcliffe that I learned
silence and listening were not passive enterprises, but active and important choices. As a
survivor, I learned that listening, monitoring tensions, using discomfort as a site for
discovering new pathways toward understanding, and acknowledging rhetoric as
something linked to power, can embolden a timid learner to risk imprecision. These acts
embolden by example not because they are brave or novel, but because they are an
embodied performance of the story as it is lived and modeled. By modeling the many
ways one can transgress a boundary and survive the implications, by demonstrating the
possibilities that arise when permeations and ruptures are invited instead of resisted, one
can redefine imagination and qualitative experience as being personal-public, located
within the self with implications for others.

O’Donohue claims that in each of us, there is a small voice of discernment
resistant to the status quo, to the falsities we encounter, all the while beckoning us toward
new perspectives and concealed meanings (75). “In extreme situations, which have been
emptied of all shelter and tenderness,” O’Donohue writes, “that small voice whispers
from somewhere beyond and encourages the heart to hold out for dignity, respect, beauty
and love” (75). Stepping away from the tradition of negation and moving toward
affirmation, particularly within a discipline still unveiling the complications to a linear
and patriarchal history, makes room – writing room – for others to bring their voices
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forward. When we cull from history the unheard whispers others left for us, as Jarratt,
Glenn, Ronald and Ritchie have, even as we encounter tradition’s din, we embody a
location, a sophistic space that invites the making of new meaning context to context,
experience to experience. Considering the public promises the field has made
surrounding social justice, equity, and inclusion – locations of deeply personal
consequence – writing room, forging pathways of scholarship that are admittedly
imprecise and demonstrative could invite others to take the risk of not quite knowing for
sure, but sponsoring the inquiry nonetheless. The arrogance of negation is found in its
violence, the ways texts are controlled and framed, pushed and pulled, without regard for
the people who produced them. If those of us in the field are going to ask our students to
be more careful, to listen to others actively, to contemplate the larger social significance
of an individual’s actions or subject position, it seems reasonable to also ask that of the
creators of scholarly texts – the texts often used as referential points on the maps students
are asked to chart.

Beyond that, by putting negation up for exploration in order to see disjunctions
between ideas as invitations instead of flaws, we can revise the scripts of tradition in
ways that include an active engagement with imprecision as a fruitful site of inquiry. We
have an opportunity, within the disjunction itself, to clop about and point to
inconsistencies, harmony, disharmony, and collision – all the messy things within the will
to know – in ways that can sponsor inquiry and invention beyond our more comfortable
perspectives in order to see the ways in which the personal-public is rendered visible,
enacted. If the body of scholarship the field has produced has proved anything it is this:
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The contestations, disjunctions, conflicting ideologies, and the tensions between
pedagogical perspectives have built a respectable field. The future of that field, its
scholarship and discourses, particularly in the postmodern era of plurality, may depend
on a collective, re-imagined sense of qualitative research as inquiry-based, expository
endeavor, ripe with imprecision, disjunction, and uncertainty. The personal gain of
traditional professional performances, particularly the manufacturing of discourses as
published (and therefore credible credential-building texts), may need to be examined as
we ask harder questions about the personal-public coordinates of our own professional
lives and how they affect both the academy and its students. Few are afforded the
comfort of endless repetition – history shows us this – and it seems the most lasting ideas
can transcend change while continuing to invite inquiry and interest. By permeating the
binaries we encounter every day, by transgressing boundaries with care and tenderness,
we may find another inroad to inquiries in order to enrich our qualitative experiences.
After all, “The imagination has no patience with repetition,” O’Donohue writes,
“Experimentation, adventure, and innovation lure us towards new horizons. What we
never thought possible now becomes an urgent and exciting pathway” (146). In
imagining scholarly work beyond negation, those who embark on the radically different
path of imprecision with personal-public intentions, may be the very future of the field
itself because small voices of discernment can become grand and shared visions once
freed from the limits of negation and tradition.
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